This study distinguishes the weak fairness property from the strong fairness property which is necessary in the quantum key agreement (QKA) and shows that most of the existing QKAs cannot achieve the strong fairness property with a key manipulation problem. To solve this problem, a model which describes the way to design a QKA with the strong fairness property is proposed. Based on the model, an example QKA is presented. Security analyses show that the proposed QKA is effective to resist not only outsider's eavesdropping attack but also insider's key manipulation.
3
KA is a process of establishing a shared secret key between entities in such a way that neither of them can predetermine the value of that key. (NOTE: By predetermine it is meant that neither entity A nor entity B can, in a computationally efficient way, choose a smaller key space and force the computed key in the protocol to fall into that key space.)
That is, in KA, the final shared key must be determined by all the involved participants. Any proper subset of the participants cannot determine or manipulate the final shared key alone. Hence, the KA protocols should not only achieve the security property but also achieve the fairness property. To achieve the security property, these proposed KA protocols are designed based on computation complexity. However, with the development of quantum computer which has excellent computational power, these proposed KA protocols face serious secure challenges [4, 5] . Hence, several researches of quantum key agreement protocol (QKA) where the security is guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics have been proposed.
In 2004, Zhou et al. [6] employed quantum teleportation technique and maximally entangled states to propose the first QKA. They claimed their protocol can ensure the participants to share a fair and secure key. However, Tsai et al. [7] commented that Zhou et al.' s protocol is susceptible to insider attacks. That is, a participant has the ability to fully control the secret key without being detected by the other. Therefore, the fairness property are not satisfied in Zhou et al's scheme. In 2010, Chong et al. [8] proposed a QKA based on the BB84 protocol [9] . They pointed out that a malicious participant, Bob, can control one bit of the key in their protocol. In 2013, several multiparty QKAs [10] [11] [12] were presented, which allow numerous participants to take part in their communication. Subsequently, Huang et al. [13] proposed a new QKA using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs and single-particle measurements. In 2014, Huang et al. [14] showed Sun et al.'s protocol cannot ensure each participant to share a 4 secure and fair key and pointed out that it is necessary to concern the fairness property in the classical postprocessing process where each participant corrects the raw key to obtain the final key. Without designing a fair classical postprocessing process, the final shared key cannot be directly used in real life. Subsequently, Huang et al. [13] proposed a method to share EPR pairs over two collective-noise channels and Yuan et al. [15] designed an identity authentication method. Both of the methods can improve the fairness of QKAs in the classical postprocessing process. Obviously, all the existing related researches of QKA [8, [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] try to achieve both of the security property and the fairness property.
To further explain the concept of the security and the fairness property clearly, it indeed requires to define the term 'security' and the term 'fairness' carefully. Moreover, according to the definition in ISO/IEC DIS 11770-3, the existing definition of 'fairness' in QKA is not rigorous. This not rigorous definition makes most of the exiting 'fairness' QKA protocols cannot achieve the real fairness property. To solve these problems, this paper proposes the security property, the weak fairness property (existing definition of 'fairness' in QKAs) and the strong fairness property (new definition of 'fairness' based on ISO/IEC DIS 11770-3) and defines respectively as follows:
 Security property: The outside eavesdropper cannot get any useful information of the final shared key without being detected and the protocol must ensure the involved participants to share an identical key. According to these definitions, QKAs in [8, 10-14, 16-22, 24-30, 32-35, 38] 5 cannot achieve the strong fairness property. That is, in the protocols, a legitimate but malicious participant has the chance to derive the final shared secret key first during the public discussion process. If the malicious participant does not like the negotiated shared secret key to be the final session key, he/she can deliberately abort the protocol and then impute the error to an outside eavesdropper without being detected. By this way, these QKAs are vulnerable to a key manipulation problem, which certainly fails the strong fairness definition in a QKA. The purpose of this paper is to present a solution model to solve this problem. By using the proposed solution model, the designed QKAs can achieve strong fairness property. For convenience, here we just take Huang et al.'s [13] QKA as an example to demonstrate the key manipulation problem in detail.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Huang et al.'s QKA and subsequently describes the key manipulation problem. Section 3 introduces the proposed model, and presents a two-party QKA as well. Besides, security and fairness analyses of the proposed QKA are provided. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 4.
Discussion of fairness property in existing QKAs
According to our research, several existing QKAs [8, 10-14, 16-22, 24-30, 32-35, 38 ] have a key manipulation problem which makes these QKAs cannot achieve the strong fairness property. Here, as an example, we use Huang et al.'s QKA protocol [13] to demonstrate it.
Review of Huang et al.'s QKA
Assume that there are two participants, Alice and Bob, who want to share a fair nbit secret key by using EPR pairs and single-particle measurements. Step S to Bob.
Step 3 Then, Bob compares his measurement results with the initial states. If the error rate is higher than a pre-defined threshold, Alice and Bob abort the protocol and start a new one. Otherwise, they continue the next step.
Step 4 Bob determines a string   0,1 n C  and sends it to Alice. Based on the string C , they perform single-particle measurements on each particle. It appears that the shared secret key cannot be determined alone by any one of the participants because both participants measure all the particles with identical bases and subsequently get the same measurement results. However, the next section will show that in fact, one of the participants has the advantage to manipulate the final key.
Key manipulation problem
Suppose that there is a malicious participant, Bob, who attempts to control one-bit of the shared secret key. In
Step 3 C that he determined in
Step 4. As a result, Bob can derive the shared secret key earlier than Alice. Suppose for some reason, Bob prefers the first bit of the negotiated key to be "0", but in fact it turns out to be a "1". Then he can deliberately notify Alice that the comparison result in the public discussion is negative. Accordingly, the protocol will be aborted and they will start a new one until Bob gets the desired key bit to be a "1". In this way, even though the unpredictability of the entangled Bell states is applied for the key negotiation, Bob can still completely determine one bit of the key or even the whole key bits.
It would be futile even if the eavesdropper detection in the public discussion is modified to be performed by Alice instead of by Bob as in the original design. To explain this, let us modify the public discussion (Step 3) as the following:
Step 3* After confirming that Bob has already received will follow the protocol. Otherwise, Bob sends fake measurement results to Alice for eavesdropping check and definitely the comparison cannot be passed. As a result, the protocol will be started again until Bob gets a desired key.
By this way, the malicious participant, Bob, can easily destroy the fairness of the protocol by publishing a fake message during the public discussion. However, Alice has no way of detecting this fraudulence. Obviously, Bob can easily manipulate the final key of a key-agreement key and attribute all the fault to an eavesdropper without being detected. Similarly, the existing QKAs [8, 10-13, 39, 40] also have the similar problem. For simplicity, we omit the discussion here.
Design of QKAs with strong fairness
This section first proposes a solution model to avoid the key manipulation problem which we have demonstrated in Section 2.2. Then, we present an example of QKA based on the proposed model in Section 3.2. Security analyses of the proposed QKA are also provided in Section 3.3. Moreover, we discuss how the proposed scheme accomplishes the strong fairness property. 
Solution model for QKA with strong fairness
Based on the discussion in Section 2 , we summarize that in order to achieve the strong fairness property, a QKA has to satisfy the following requirements in the designing phase: (1) No participant is able to derive the final secret key before the public discussion is finished (2) Any manipulation on the shared key will be detected by the other participants.
Based on the above requirements, the proposed solution model for a fair QKA is divided into three stages as follows (also shown in Figure 1 ): The main idea of the model is that the shared secret key cannot be derived until the participants have confirmed that the channel is free from the eavesdropping attacks.
In other words, a QKA with strong fairness has to prevent any participant from obtaining the shared secret key before completing the public discussion. Step 
Step 2
Alice generates two sequences of single particles 
Public Discussion Stage:
Step 3 After receiving the sequences, Alice and Bob acknowledge each other via an authenticated classical channel. Then, they publish the positions and the measurement bases of the decoy particles. Based on the published information, the receiver measures the decoy particles and subsequently returns the measurement results back to the original sender. Now, Alice and Bob check whether the received measurement results are matched to the initial states they prepared. If the error rate is higher than a pre-defined threshold, the protocol will be aborted. Otherwise, Alice and Bob can confirm that the channel is free from the eavesdropping attacks.
Key Generation Stage:
Step Step 6 Alice and Bob can construct a shared raw key as
Step 
Security analyses and fairness analyses
Here, we show that the proposed QKA is secure against both the outsider eavesdropping attack and insider attack. In addition, we discuss how the proposed scheme satisfies the requirements of the strong fairness property.
Security against outsider attack
In this part, we use several well-known attacks (measure and resend attack, correlation-elicitation attack) as examples to show that the proposed QKA is secure against the outsider eavesdropping attack. Moreover, we prove that the proposed protocol is free from information leakage. Therefore, Eve will pass the public discussion with a significant probability in Step 3.
However, if there are numerous decoy particles (denote the number as l ) suffering from Eve's attack, the probability that Eve can pass the check has become 3 4 l   
. In other words, Eve will be detected with a probability closed to 1 if the number l is large enough.
b. Correlation-Elicitation Attack
In case of Correlation-Elicitation (CE) attack, the eavesdropper Eve may try to to detect the eavesdropping. Because in this case, the control bit has been entangled with the target bit. Obviously, there is the probability of 1 2 to get the same measurement result of the control bit as before and the probability of 1 2 to get a different measurement result. Overall, for one decoy photon, the detection rate is 1 4 . Hence, the probability that Eve can pass the check is 3 4 l    , which means that Eve will be detected with a probability closed to 1 if the number l is large enough.
c. Information Leakage Analysis
The security of the final shared key is very important for the participants, and information leakage is a kind of passive attack that enables Eve to extract the secret key from the measurement results. In the following, we demonstrate that the proposed QKA can prevent the information leakage problem.
In the proposed protocol, if Eve wants to eavesdrop any useful information, he must intercepts the Resend Attack, for one bit, the probability for Eve to obtain the correct measurement result is 3 4 . Hence, the measurement result of one qubit contains attack can be detected in the Step 3. Moreover, in the Step 7, the privacy amplification can ensure there is no information leakage in the proposed protocol. For example, if we assume the privacy amplification remains 80% of the raw key K to be the final secret key K . In other words, the reduced part is 20% which larger than 18.87%. Obviously, the proposed quantum key agreement protocol is free from information leakage.
Security against insider attack
This study points out that most of the QKAs suffer from the key manipulation problem as discussed in Section 2. Now we propose several possible scenarios to prove that our QKA can resist such an insider attack. In other words, the proposed protocol can achieve the strong fairness property. 
Strong Fairness
Section 3.1 described how to achieve the strong fairness property in a QKA. In the case of our proposed scheme, participants cannot obtain any useful information (other participants' private keys or hash values) to derive the final shared secret key until the public discussion finished. Hence, according to the proposed solution model, if a malicious participant tries to deliberately abort the protocol to manipulate the final key, then with a high probability he/she would be detected by the other participant.
Conclusion
This paper has pointed out that, according to the ISO/IEC DIS 11770-3, the existing definition of 'fairness' in QKAs is not rigorous and proposed the definition of the weak 17 fairness property and the strong fairness property. Besides, most of the existing QKAs suffer from the key manipulation problem, which further causes these protocols unable to satisfy the strong fairness property. In this regard, we have proposed a model which provides a way of designing a QKA with the strong fairness property. Furthermore, we have presented a two-party QKA based on the solution model. Security analysis shows that the proposed QKA is secure against both the outsider and insider attacks, and also can avoid the key manipulation problem. Moreover, the same strategy described in Section 2.2 can also be applied to the construction of fair probabilistic quantum key distribution [43] .
Finally, it is noteworthy to mention an issue which should be considered in the proposed two-party QKA. In Step 4 of the protocol, even the misconduct of the malicious participant, Bob, will certainly be detected by Alice in the protocol, Alice has no way to prove Bob's misconduct to a third person. As a consequence, this dispute cannot be solved adequately. Hence, how to solve this problem will be an interesting open problem.
